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Abstract. In this paper we argue that contextual multi-armed bandit
algorithms could open avenues for designing self-learning security mod-
ules for computer networks and related tasks. The paper has two con-
tributions: a conceptual one and an algorithmical one. The conceptual
contribution is to formulate – as an example – the real-world problem
of preventing SPIT (Spam in VoIP networks), which is currently not
satisfyingly addressed by standard techniques, as a sequential learning
problem, namely as a contextual multi-armed bandit. Our second contri-
bution is to present CMABFAS, a new algorithm for general contextual
multi-armed bandit learning that specifically targets domains with fi-
nite actions. We illustrate how CMABFAS could be used to design a
fully self-learning SPIT filter that does not rely on feedback from the
end-user (i.e., does not require labeled data) and report first simulation
results.
1 Introduction
SPIT is an acronym for spam in internet telephony and refers to unsolicited calls
that, when answered by a human, would deliver a pre-recorded message (e.g.,
advertisement or phishing attempts). Similar to spam in emails, SPIT exploits
the openness of the existing infrastructure (e.g., no strongly authenticated identi-
ties) together with the fact that VoIP calls can be easily generated automatically
and at zero (or very low) costs. Unlike with spam in emails however, where the
content consists of text and can be analyzed before it is delivered, the content of
a phone call (a voice stream) is only available when the call is answered. Thus
many of the defensive measures that are effective against email spam do not
directly translate to SPIT mitigation. Previously, some first ideas have already
been suggested to address this problem. They range from reputation-based [11,5]
and call-frequency based [21] dynamic black-listing, fingerprinting [26], to chal-
lenging suspicious calls by captchas [20,23,18], or the use of standard machine
learning such as anomaly detection [16,14], clustering [25], or decision trees [15].
We believe that with respect to SPIT prevention these earlier solutions suffer
from one or both of the following two shortcomings: (1) they are built on weak
“features” (i.e., information from the protocol header SIP which in essence are
text strings produced by the VoIP client) which are fairly easy to manipulate for
a sophisticated hacker; (2) they are built as a static defense from labeled training
2data (e.g., signatures of known attacks), require constantly manual adjustments
from a human domain expert and are thus vulnerable to novel attacks.
In this paper we explore a novel paradigm in machine learning, namely rein-
forcement learning, to attack this problem from a new angle. Specifically, we use
contextual multi-armed bandits to design a self-learning SPIT filter which dy-
namically selects from among several security policies (i.e., voice captchas and
computational puzzles) the most appropriate one and which does not rely on
explicit feedback from the end-user (i.e., labeled training data)—instead, the
SPIT filter monitors its own performance and generates internal rewards from
subsequent traffic.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 with describing
the philosophy behind the design of our SPIT filter and motivate the use of
contextual bandits to implement it in the real world. The following Section 3
introduces our algorithm CMABFAS, a variant of a contextual MAB for learning
in finite action spaces over generalized metric spaces, which will have exactly the
properties we need for our SPIT filter. Note that our description of CMABFAS in
this section will be kept general (such that it can be applied to other problems as
well); in Section 4 we then describe in detail how we can map the SPIT prevention
problem from Section 2 to CMABFAS. Section 5 then presents some simulation
results and compares CMABFAS with a more na¨ıve baseline implementation of
MABs.
2 Background and related work
Before we can start, we feel it necessary to give a fair warning to the reader. At
the present time, VoIP telephony has not (yet) replaced traditional telephony
and the problem of SPIT is largely a hypothetical one. In particular, there is
no publicly available dataset1 and little experience of what SPIT will look like
in the real world. To the best of our knowledge, the “empirical evaluation” of
all earlier research on SPIT prevention is therefore based on guesswork and
simulation. In this paper, we will face the same situation; however, our method
also has to interact with the calling party – which is even harder to simulate
realistically and cannot be done from a static dataset. Our method will therefore
also be evaluated in only a simplified testbed where the behavior of SPIT bots
is “emulated” by distributions the parameters of which are synthetically chosen
by hand.
1 The earlier work described in [17] set out to precisely change that. In it the authors
describe a methodology for creating SPIT traffic and also provide a common data
set for the use in benchmark comparisons. However, the data set they provide is
generated from “emulated users based on a social model”; in essence, the authors
use common tools to generate the SPIT traffic, where the relevant features, such as
call duration, inter-arrival time, behavior upon receiving a call, etc. are all modeled
by sampling from distributions. For example, the call duration was generated from
an exponential distribution the parameter of which was specified by hand (which
amounts to the same as what we do here).
32.1 Related work: Designing a SPIT filter
We consider the inbound scenario, where the SPIT filter is located close to the
recipient of the call (e.g., at the VoIP proxy) and decisions must be made on a
per-call basis without having explicit history information on a per-source basis
(thus ruling out reputation-based methods). For every incoming call the system
has to decide whether it is a regular call or a SPIT call using only features
directly extracted from the request, i.e., text strings extracted from the fields
of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) header in an INVITE message. Current
hardware phones are identifiable through the specific SIP header they produce,
and it is conceivable that SPIT bots could be equally identifiable through the
specific SIP header they produce. Nevertheless we believe that, from this infor-
mation alone, traditional static techniques are not sufficient to build a strong
filter that detects and blocks SPIT with high accuracy. This has two reasons:
(1) any such signature-based defense will require a human expert to manually
identify and add signatures of SPIT bots to a list of known attacks which is a
costly procedure and leaves the system vulnerable to novel attacks; and (2) the
information in the protocol header is weak in the sense that it can be easily ma-
nipulated by a sophisticated hacker to make a SPIT call appear as if originating
from a regular device.
An interesting idea suggested in [20,7] and on which we are going to build
is for the defensive system to collect additional information that would be a lot
harder for SPIT to manipulate; so-called Turing tests or voice CAPTCHAS that
would actively interact with the calling party. For example, before forwarding a
call, an automated mechanism could prompt a suspicious caller to dial a short
sequence of randomly generated digits. Both the reaction of the caller to the test
(a bot is not likely to obey telephone etiquette and would immediately start to
play back its pre-recorded message), as well as the result of the test itself (only
a very sophisticated bot will be able to break a voice CAPTCHA) will reveal
additional information about whether or not the caller is a human or a SPIT bot.
A large number of these security challenges, most of which are parameterized
to generate an infinite variety, already exists today; however, deciding which of
these security challenges to best apply given the features of a call is currently
done by a human expert (e.g., see NEC’s SEAL [20]). Deciding for which call
what security challenge to best apply is, however, not trivial. On the one side,
applying a challenge will reveal additional information about the call being SPIT
or not. On the other side, applying it will also carry certain costs, namely: (1)
annoying the calling party; (2) additional computational resources; and (3) ob-
fuscation, meaning that we would prefer to avoid exposing all capabilities of our
defense system such that attackers can not start to learn from them. The essen-
tial point here is that, while it would result in the least number of mistakes, we
cannot afford to apply our strongest but likely most “costly” security challenge
to every single call.
Based on this design for a SPIT filter which can choose from many possible
security challenges or actions (where we include “apply no security challenge” as
just another action), our goal is to create a self-learning SPIT filter which does
4not rely on hand-coded rules but automatically determines from past experience
what the “best” security challenge should be for a given call. This self-learning
does not rely on external feedback; instead the system monitors its own perfor-
mance and generates internal rewards. Moreover, this self-learning also ensures
that the system will adapt to new variants of SPIT as part of its normal opera-
tion.
A sketch of the basic interaction loop between
caller and SPIT filter is shown to the right. In this
figure, calls are processed sequentially (individually
one by one). Every time a call arrives at the SPIT
filter, the SPIT filter selects one action and applies
it to the call. Each action forces a response from the
caller (e.g., passing/failing a security challenge or, if
the call is made, features from the call such as call
duration, amount of double talk, etc.). This response
is analyzed by the internal reward generator by first
inferring whether or not the caller is a SPIT bot.
Then, depending on the outcome of this inference
stage (which may be a probability for the call being
SPIT), the nature of the action chosen (if it is likely
SPIT, did we chose an action that tried to prevent
it), and the cost of the action, a scalar reward is returned to the SPIT filter.
From this reward the SPIT filter updates its internal (call,action)-scores and
proceeds with the next call in the queue.
In summary, to implement this design for a SPIT filter, we have to address
two issues: (1) how to implement the reward generator; (2) how to implement
the action selection and learning part. Note that in this paper we focus on the
latter.
2.2 Background: Multi-armed bandits
To implement learning, we formalize our SPIT filter as a multi-armed bandit
problem (MAB) with context. Standard MABs are well-studied models for se-
quential decision-making when the outcome is stochastic and its distribution a
priori unknown. In a standard MAB we assume we get to play the following
“game” over multiple rounds: suppose we are given n different choices or actions
and each action is associated with a stochastic reward function (that stays the
same for all rounds we play but may be different for each action). In every round
of the game we have to choose one of the n possible actions, and in doing so we
obtain a random reward sampled from the underlying distribution. Our goal is
to choose actions such that the sum of rewards we obtain is maximized.
Naturally, the best action would be to always choose the action yielding the
highest expected reward. However, the reward distributions are not revealed to
the player and thus it is (initially) unknown which action will produce the highest
reward. To solve this problem, we have to form an estimate for each action about
what reward we might get, based on what results we have obtained in earlier
5rounds of the game. Of course, the more often we have tried a particular action
in the past, the more certain and reliable this estimate will be. The fundamental
dilemma is now how to balance exploitation (choosing what currently appears
to be the best action) and exploration (choosing a non-greedy action to improve
our estimate and potentially obtain higher rewards in the future). The standard
MAB problem with finite (and small) number of actions is largely considered to
be a solved problem and provable optimal strategies exist in the literature [12,2].
A contextual MAB is in principle like a standard MAB with the major differ-
ence that it is defined over some large set of elements or a continuous space. Now
each element of the set corresponds to a separate standard MAB (in some formu-
lations also the action space becomes large or continuous). Learning the reward
distributions in contextual MABs is more challenging than it is for standard
MAB since it is no longer possible to sample the same action multiple times. In-
stead, we have to impose “smoothness” as additional structural assumption; i.e.,
we assume that elements of the context space that are “similar” (with respect
to some similarity measure) will also behave similarly. Using generalization we
can then try to predict the outcome for new cases based on previously observed
outcomes for similar cases. Contextual MAB are nowadays an active research
topic with many relevant real-world applications, e.g., placement of web adver-
tisements. See [24,13,19,22,10,8] for some examples.
We believe that contextual MABs (but not standard MABs) are a good
description of what the SPIT filter motivated in the previous section is trying
to achieve: the contexts correspond to calls (represented by SIP headers), the
actions correspond to security challenges the filter can choose from, and the
rewards correspond to how the calling party reacts.
3 Description of CMABFAS
This section describes our algorithm CMABFAS for contextual MAB in finite
action spaces. Note that we keep the presentation general, the actual application
to the SPIT prevention scenario will be described in the following Section 4. Our
work is largely based on the contextual zooming algorithm described in [22], and
inspired by the X-armed bandit learning algorithm described in [4]. Differences
between CMABFAS and [22] are: a specialization to the finite action case and a
modified scheme to estimate the expected rewards which works for more general
metric spaces (we do not need the triangle inequality).
3.1 Notation
We begin by introducing some notation. Let X denote the context space with
elements x ∈ X and let a ∈ {1, . . . , k} denote the possible actions that can be
chosen for each x (we assume that we have the same choice of actions available
for each x). Each context x can be seen as an index to a conventional k-armed
bandit: for each x we have a distribution of rewards Ra(x) under action a which
models the stochastic response from the environment when performing action a
6in context x. Let ra(x) denote the random values drawn from the corresponding
reward distribution, i.e., ra(x) ∼ Ra(x). We assume that Ra(x) has bounded
support which, for notational convenience, is supposed to lie in the unit interval;
thus we assume suppRa(x) ⊆ [0, 1]. In consequence, we also have ra(x) ∈ [0, 1].
Let µa(x) denote the mean of the reward distribution Ra(x); i.e.,
µa(x) := Era(x)∼Ra(x)
[
ra(x)
]
. (1)
The essence of the problem we study is that Ra(x), and hence µa(x), is not
known when making decisions; instead it is treated as a black-box from which
only samples can be drawn. Our overall goal is, when presented with any context
x, to be able to choose the action with the highest mean: argmaxa µ
a(x). The
algorithm we propose is based on taking and averaging samples in a smart way
such that observations we made at one location x are reused to make an estimate
about the reward distribution at another location x′.
Let context space X be equipped with a distance metric d(x, x′) which mea-
sures the distance between any two elements x, x′ ∈ X . We assume that d is a
pseudo-metric and fulfills the conditions of (1) non-negativity: d(x, x′) ≥ 0; (2)
symmetry: d(x, x′) = d(x′, x); and (3) is equal to zero if and only if the argu-
ments are identical: d(x, x′) = 0 ⇔ x = x′, ∀x, x′ ∈ X . Furthermore we assume
that, for notational convenience again, d is scaled such that the diameter of X
with respect to d is equal to one; that is, supx,x′∈X d(x, x
′) = 1.
Finally, to make learning and generalization over the context space at all
possible, we need to impose smoothness and restrict the variation of the mean
functions µa. Specifically, we assume that each µa is Lipschitz with a modulus
of variation λ > 0:
|µa(x)− µa(x′)| < λd(x, x′), ∀x, x′ ∈ X , ∀a. (2)
3.2 Objective
The goal of contextual MAB is to find a strategy for the following “game”. The
game proceeds in rounds t = 1, 2, . . .. At each round t we observe xt ∈ X ; we
suppose that we have no control over how xt is generated from the set X and
furthermore that the mechanics leading to the selection of an xt are independent
from whatever happened in all previous rounds of the game. Given xt, we have
to choose an action at ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Executing action at lets us then observe the
reward rat(xt) which is a random sample from R
at(xt). Our goal is to use the
results of the t− 1 previous rounds of the game, i.e., the history
(x1, a1, r
a1(x1), . . . , xt−1, at−1, r
at−1(xt−1)),
to determine an action at such that the regret – a measure of performance – is
minimized. In the bandit literature two types of regret are considered: here we
take the cumulative regret which assumes that we have to play the game for a
fixed number T of rounds and that we want to minimize over all T rounds the
7difference between the expected reward of the best possible action minus the
expected reward of the action chosen at that round:
regret =
T∑
t=1
|µ∗(xt)− µ
at(xt)|, (3)
where µ∗(xt) = maxa∈{1,...,k} µ
a(xt).
3.3 Illustration
Figure 1 tries to depict the whole situation graphically. In it, we chose to draw X
as a straight line, suggesting that it is a continuous and compact space (however
in theory it can equally well be a discrete or finite space). Mean reward µa(x)
is drawn as a continuous function over X ; the figure shows two mean functions
µ1(x) and µ2(x) corresponding to two possible actions a ∈ {1, 2}. For each
location x and action a we have a separate reward distribution Ra(x) from
which random samples ra(x) are gathered.
The goal is to find for each x the action with the highest expected reward,
which in our illustration is the curve which is on top of the other curve. As the
figure shows, in general we will not have the situation that one and the same
action is optimal everywhere. Instead, because of the smoothness2 assumptions
we made for µa, there will be “regions” where one action is optimal, and regions
where another one is optimal.
Note that the figure is somewhat misleading in the way the random samples
are shown; from Figure 1(top) it appears as if multiple samples from the same
distribution (i.e., same location and same action) can be gathered. This however
is exactly the situation we do not have (it would correspond to the traditional
multi-armed bandit scenario). A more realistic representation of the situation
we face is thus Figure 1(bottom); it shows how the samples are spread out over
different locations and actions and motivates why at all it becomes necessary to
average and generalize over the context space X .
3.4 CMABFAS – High-level overview
Our algorithm CMABFAS works as follows. For each action a separately, we
incrementally construct over time t = 1, 2, . . . a cover of the context space X .
The cover consists of ball-shaped regions where individual balls are centered on
a certain subset of the contexts {x1, . . . , xt−1} seen so far. The cover is hierar-
chical with the radius of the balls exponentially fast decreasing with the level
of hierarchy; e.g., X is covered at level 1 by a single ball of radius 1, at level
2 Note that in our mathematical formulation of the problem smoothness is only im-
posed over the means of the distribution. The actual form of the distribution (such
as being concentrated around the mean, being multi-modal, etc.) could vary from
location to location and thus also impact the practical performance.
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Fig. 1. Contextual multi-armed bandit with two actions (blue) and (red) over
context space X (in our case X will be the space of SIP headers). Each
point/location x ∈ X is associated with an action-dependent reward distribution
the mean of which is denoted by the blue and red curve. Top: sample rewards
are observed at location x′ and x′′ with the shaded area denoting the underlying
distribution. Bottom: a more realistic illustration; in practice, multiple reward
samples are rarely obtained at the same location. Instead they are spread out
and need to be aggregated in a judicious way to estimate the expected reward
at a new query location xt.
2 by balls of radius 1/2, at level 3 by balls of radius 1/4, and so on (see Fig-
ure 2). Each ball aggregates the reward samples lying within: we only store their
number and their sum. Each ball covering xt can thus be used to estimate the
expected reward µa(xt) at query point xt. Since we have to balance exploration
and exploitation, we will augment this estimate by a UCB-like term (i.e., an
upper confidence bound). Each ball covering xt thus gives rise to a score which
is composed of two parts: (1) the sample average within the ball, and (2) an
uncertainty term which depends on the number of samples (the fewer samples
we have in a ball, the less certain we can be about the correctness of their aver-
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Fig. 2. Adaptively covering the context space with ball-shaped regions (see text)
age) and the volume of the ball (the larger the region the ball covers, the more
variation of µa is possible and thus the more samples of a different base quantity
are lumped together). The “best ball” for each action is the one with the lowest
score (the tightest upper bound), and among them the highest score indicates
the best action. The cover is adaptively refined by adding new balls according
to the following rules: (1) a new ball can only be created centered at (xt, at);
(2) a new ball can only be created if the number of samples in the parent ball
exceeds a certain threshold (which grows inverse quadratically in the radius of
the parent ball); (3) a new ball is only created if it will not overlap with already
existing balls at the same level in the hierarchy. Informally speaking, CMABFAS
works by ensuring that high resolutions are only attained in regions of X where
the corresponding action is optimal and then exploiting that balls with increas-
ingly smaller radius provide increasingly more accurate bounds for the expected
reward.
From a practical point of view our algorithm possesses two properties which
make it ideally suited for operation under heavy-load real-world conditions: (1)
it is an online algorithm whose computational complexity and storage require-
ments are very low (this is so because we do not have to store and operate on
an always growing number of individual data points, but only have to store and
operate on balls of a fixed radius, which is a much smaller number3 and where
search operations can be efficiently implemented by appropriate space partition-
ing methods such as cover trees [3]; (2) it is an anytime algorithm which aims
at producing the best possible solution in each step of its operation and does
not need any kind of prior learning phase with data or tuning to start producing
meaningful results.
3 The number of balls of radius r is trivially upper bound by the r-packing number
of X . A more tighter bound can be achieved by the near-optimality dimension or
related concepts (e.g., see [4,22]) which also take into account the specifics of the
actual problem, i.e., µa.
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3.5 CMABFAS – Notation
Before we come to the details of the algorithm, we need to introduce some more
notation. Let Bai ∈ {1, . . . , n
a
B} be the index of the i-th ball and n
a
B the total
number of balls in the cover for action a. Let x(Bai ) ∈ X denote the location
of ball Bai , that is, the location of its center in X , and let r(B
a
i ) ∈ [0, 1] denote
its radius. We say that an element x ∈ X lies in ball Bai , written as x ∈ B
a
i , if
d(x, x(Bai )) ≤ r(B
a
i ). Overloading the notation, we can identify with B
i
a also the
region Bai = {x ∈ X | d(x, x(B
a
i )) ≤ r(B
a
i )} ⊂ X . Let nt(B
a
i ) denote the number
of all the samples gathered up to time t lying in Bai , and let ̺t(B
a
i ) denote their
corresponding sum of rewards. Let
avgt(B
a
i ) := ̺t(B
a
i )/nt(B
a
i )
conft(B
a
i ) := c ·
√
logT/nt(Bai )
size(Bai ) := 2λr(B
a
i )
where c is a constant (which in practice will become a tunable parameter of
the algorithm). We say that ball Bai is full (able to spawn a child), whenever
conft(B
a
i ) < r(B
a
i ).
3.6 CMABFAS – Algorithm
Initialization: At time t = 0 we initialize the individual cover for each action
with a single ball: we create a ball centered on an arbitrary element x ∈ X and
set its radius to 1 (such that it covers the whole space):
∀a = 1, . . . , k : create Ba1 with
x(Ba1 ) := any element of X
r(Ba1 ) := 1, n0(B
a
1 ) := 0, ̺0(B
a
1 ) := 0.
Every step: Now suppose that at time t xt arrives. For each action a separately,
we first compute the indices of those balls that contain xt, which we will call
active balls for xt: A
a(xt) := {B
a
i |xt ∈ B
a
i }. From the set of active balls we then
compute the set of relevant balls which consists of all balls Bai ∈ A
a(xt) which
are either not full or allow the creation of a child (with radius 12r(B
a
i )) centered
on xt such that it does not overlap (distance at least
1
2r(B
a
i )) with an already
existing ball at this level of the hierarchy: Ra(xt) := {B
a
i ∈ A
a(xt) | conft(B
a
i ) >
r(Bai ) ∨ ∄B
a
j ∈ A
a(xt) : r(B
a
j ) =
1
2r(B
a
i )}. For each ball in R
a(xt) we then
compute its current score, which is a high-probability upper bound4 for the
error we make when we use the current in-ball sample average as a proxy for the
true but unknown expected reward µa(xt). We take the minimum over all the
4 The argument goes as follows. Let xt be the current context and take any active ball
Bai ∈ A
a(xt). Let Sn be the set of indices of previous samples lying in the ball and
|Sn| = n be their number. Applying Azuma-Hoeffding for martingales with bounded
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upper bounds as score u(xt, a) for the action in question (i.e., the tightest upper
bound):
u(xt, a) := min
Ba
i
∈Ra(xt)
[
avgt(B
a
i ) + conft(B
a
i ) + sizet(B
a
i )
]
. (4)
Having such a u-score for each possible action a, we then choose the action which
achieves the highest u-score:
a∗t := argmax
a=1...k
u(xt, a). (5)
The system executes action a∗t and observes the stochastic outcome r
a∗t (xt) which
is drawn from the unknown distribution Ra
∗
t (xt). We then use this new obser-
vation to update all the balls that were active for the action chosen:
∀Bai ∈ A
a∗t (xt) : ̺t+1(B
a
i ) = ̺t(B
a
i ) + r
a∗t (xt)
nt+1(B
a
i ) = nt(B
a
i ) + 1
all remaining balls: ̺t+1(B
a
i ) = ̺t(B
a
i )
nt+1(B
a
i ) = nt(B
a
i ).
Adaptive refinement: Having determined a∗t and before updating, we test if
the ball B∗ achieving the minimum in (4) for action a∗t is full (and thus allowed
to spawn a child). If it is full, we add a new ball B∗child with center xt and radius
1
2r(B
∗) and add its index to the list of active balls.
4 CMABFAS for SPIT
This section describes how we can map our original problem, detecting and
preventing SPIT calls (as described in Section 2), to the general self-learning
decision-making framework CMABFAS described in the previous section. This
is done as follows:
increments together with the union bound, one can show that
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
s∈Sn
[ra(xs)− µ
a(xs)]
∣∣∣∣∣ < c ·
√
log T
n
)
≥ 1− T−2.
Using the Lipschitz assumption (2) together with the fact that both xt and xs, ∀s,
lie in the same ball Bai with radius r(B
a
i ) we then have that
|µa(xs)− µ
a(xt)| ≤ λ · d(xs, xt) ≤ λ2r(B
a
i ) ∀s
and thus µa(xs) ≤ µ
a(xt) + λ2r(B
a
i ). Substituting µ
a(xs) accordingly gives us a
lower bound for the left side inside P (·), and, noting that 1
n
∑
s∈Sn
ra(xs) =
̺t(B
a
i
nt(B
a
i
)
,
we obtain as claimed
P
(∣∣∣∣ ̺t(Bai )nt(Bai ) − µa(xt)
∣∣∣∣ < c ·
√
log T
nt(Bai )
+ 2λr(Bai )
)
≥ 1− T−2.
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4.1 Defining the context space
The context space X is chosen to be the space of all possible VoIP calls, which
we represent by the information contained in the SIP header. Specifically, we
extract the fields source IP addresses, contact information for caller, callees and
optional vias, plus fields that have a phone-specific value such as user-agent
string, preferred codec and source port number. The SIP addresses of both par-
ties are further split into user and host names. The result is combined to form a
vector of 16 text strings. For example, one such call x ∈ X is of the form
x =[“208.51.215.203”,“193.22.119.20”,“5838565”,
“208.51.215.203”,“193.22.119.20”,“5838565”,
“208.51.215.203”, “87008888”, “208.51.215.203”,
“87008888”,“Cisco-SIPGateway/IOS-12.x”, “208.51.215.203”,
“CiscoSystemsSIP-GW-UserAgent”, “ 208.51.215.203”,
“18660 G723/8000”]
To measure distances in X , we define a metric over SIP headers in the following
way:
d(x, x′) =
{
0 , if count(x, x′) = 16
2−count(x,x
′) , otherwise
.
where count(x, x′) computes the Hamming distance and returns the number of
string attributes that are identical in x and x′ (count performs a string com-
parison for each attribute individually). As an example, under this metric d
two calls have distance d(x, x′) = 0 if each attribute in x is identical to its
counterpart in x′, distance d(x, x′) = 12 if only 1 attribute in x and x
′ agrees,
and distance d(x, x′) = 1 if no attribute in x and x′ agrees, that is, x and x′
are completely different. Note that with this definition of d the normalization
requirement diam(X ) = 1 is fulfilled.
4.2 Defining the actions
The action the system has to decide about consists of choosing which particular
security test out of many possible ones to apply to a given call. We assume
that both human and automated bot will either pass or fail to pass a security
test with a certain probability. In general there will be different types of security
tests with each of them being of a certain difficulty and thus inducing different
probabilities for success and costs. In our experiments we simplify this setting
and define initially two abstract security tests which we call Type-1 and Type-2.
For each security test and call x ∈ X we assign synthetic success probabilities
which we design in such a way that different kinds of bots exist having each
different capabilities to bypass a particular security test (as will be explained
in more detail below). Overall, the system has the following three actions at its
disposal:
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A1 A2 A3
normal 1.0 0.9 0.8
honeypot 1.0 0.5 0.3
voipbot 1.0 0.3 0.5
warvox 1.0 0.1 0.3
spitter 1.0 0.3 0.3
(a) Chosen success probs
A1 A2 A3
normal 120 28 36
honeypot 30 15 49
voipbot 30 49 15
warvox 30 83 49
spitter 30 49 83
(b) Resulting expected reward
A1 A2 A3
normal 0 92 84
honeypot 19 34 0
voipbot 19 0 34
warvox 53 0 34
spitter 53 34 0
(c) Resulting regret
Fig. 3. Reward specification (see text). The optimal action is shown in bold face.
– A1: Apply no security test and directly pass the call on to the recipient
– A2: Apply security test Type-1. If the caller is able to pass the test success-
fully, forward the call to the recipient. If the caller is not able to pass the
test successfully in one attempt, flag the call as SPIT.
– A3: Apply security test Type-2 and proceed as in A2.
4.3 Defining the rewards
Defining the rewards is the one rather difficult modeling choice we face. The
reward is a single scalar quantity that must capture the performance of the
SPIT filter. It has to be defined in such a way that by choosing actions which
optimize it (which is what CMABFAS does), the SPIT filter does what we, as
its designer, want it to do. In our case here the reward has to account for two
things: (1) did we make the right decision in letting through a call or rejecting
it; and (2) how “expensive” were the security tests necessary to arrive at this
decision. While we imagine that the latter can be designed by a human expert
without too much trouble, the first item poses a serious conceptual challenge:
whether or not a call x is SPIT is beyond the system to detect on its own and
cannot be established during runtime. Instead it would require human feedback
much the same as an email spam filter requires labeled data or humans moving
suspicious email to a dedicated spam folder. However, we would rather like our
SPIT filter to be able to detect by itself if a call is SPIT (and thus generate the
internal reward appropriately) without relying on humans pushing a red button
every time SPIT gets through.
Motivated by earlier work [9], we believe that one property5 of calls which
can be used in this regard is call duration. The basic idea is that, on the average,
SPIT calls will tend to be of shorter duration than NON-SPIT calls. Based
on a large data set of collected real-world call durations [6], we will model call
duration by an exponential distribution with mean 30 seconds for SPIT calls and
mean 120 seconds for NON-SPIT calls. If, however, a call is flagged as SPIT,
5 Of course, other features would also be possible, e.g., amount of double-talk, time-
to-speech etc. (see [9]), and it is an open question of how to use these features to
design rewards properly. Our modeling here should merely be seen as a first concept
of proof.
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we do not observe its call duration since the call is not physically answered. in
this case we assign it a fixed reward of +100. The rationale for assigning +100
is that, on the average (i) SPIT will fail the security test and NON-SPIT will
pass it and (ii) the reward of +100 is larger than the expected call duration for
SPIT and smaller than the expected call duration for NON-SPIT, thus making
one of the actions A2 or A3 optimal for SPIT and action A1 always optimal
for NON-SPIT. Finally, whenever we choose action A2 or A3 we always incur,
regardless of the outcome, a fixed cost which was set to -100. In summary, the
reward is generated according to the following rule:
– Generating the reward for applying action A1 to call x:
• if x ∈ SPIT, reward rA1(x) is sampled from Exp(30)
• if x ∈ NON-SPIT, reward rA1(x) is sampled from Exp(120)
– Generating the reward for applying action A2/A3 to call x:
• if x passes the security test (the probability of which depends on x and A2/A3)
∗ if x ∈ SPIT, reward rA2/A3(x) is sampled from Exp(30) minus cost of A2/A3
∗ if x ∈ NON-SPIT, reward rA2/A3(x) is sampled from Exp(120) minus
cost of A2/A3
• else if x fails the security test
∗ reward rA2/A3(x) := 100 minus cost of A2/A3
To model if a call x is able to pass a security test, we generate a single Bernoulli
trial whose mean depends on x and A2/A3 (see Figure 3a).
4.4 Setting up the experiment
Finally, we have to discuss how x is related to being SPIT or NON-SPIT. Our
experiments are based on a dataset which is a capture of 5609 calls from a real
network operator under non-disclosure agreement. Neither SPIT nor other unde-
sired activity was reported during this period of time. Additionally, we generated
2827 calls using available security testing tools in a test-bed environment and
recorded the corresponding SIP messages. Internally, x thus belongs to one of 5
classes: normal, warvox (http://warvox.org), spitter (http://hackingvoip.com/
sec tools.html), voipbot (http://voipbot.gforge.inria.fr), or honeypot
(http://artemisa.sourceforge.net). The first class is NON-SPIT, the last
corresponds to unsolicited scanning activity, and the other 3 remaining classes
are all different kinds of SPIT with a different signature. In our experiment, we
assume that each of these classes has different capabilities of passing a given
security test, making it necessary to combat each class with a different optimal
action. These different capabilities are implemented by assigning (by hand) dif-
ferent success probabilites to each class for each action. The reward distributions
that results from our choices are summarized in Figure 3. Note again that all
these detailed mechanics are not known by the CMABFAS SPIT filter; the only
thing the filter sees are the rewards sampled from the rule given above.
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5 Simulation Results
Setup To populate the context space, we first generate a corpus of 8436 SIP
headers as described in the previous section (5609 of type normal, 870 of type
spitter, 6 of type honeypot, 80 of type warvox, 1861 of type voipbot). Every time
we simulate a new call, we draw a random header uniformly from this corpus and
present it to the CMABFAS learner. We consider three scenarios of increasing
difficulty: one where the SPIT filter has to choose among three different actions
A1,A2,A3, one where it has to choose among 10 different actions A1,. . .,A10,
and one where it has to choose among 50 different actions A1,. . .,A50. The three
action scenario was described in the previous section, the other scenarios are
obtained by just adding more choices of security tests to the disposal of the
SPIT filter and setting success probabilities accordingly. Note that increasing
the number of choices makes the task of finding the best choice more difficult
(in that it requires more exploration). The stochastic rewards are scaled to lie in
[0, 1] and are generated as shown in Figure 3 (actions A4. . .A50 are populated
similarly). The Lipschitz constant λ from Eq. (2) is set to 1. We perform a
total of 10 independent runs and average the results; each single run consists of
sequentially processing 10,000,000 independent calls.
Baseline To properly evaluate the performance our algorithm CMABFAS, we de-
fine a na¨ıve baseline method which works by incrementally (but non-adaptively)
clustering the input space X and assigning a standard MAB with UCB1(1.2)
rule [1] to each cluster. Specifically, it works like this: let xt be the current call.
Find the nearest cluster according to the Hamming distance. If the distance to
the nearest cluster is greater than some parameter max radius and the number
of current clusters is below some other parameter max clusters, we add a new
cluster and initialize its counter to zero. Otherwise we assign xt to the nearest
cluster with index i∗ and choose action a∗ such that
a∗ = argmax
a
̺t(i
∗, a)
nt(i∗, a)
+
√
1.2 log(nt(i∗, a))
nt(i∗)
,
where ̺t(i
∗, a) is the sum of rewards for action a, nt(i
∗, a) the number of sam-
ples for action a, and nt(i
∗) the total number of samples within cluster i∗.
Choosing a∗, we observe, as before, a reward ra
∗
(xt) after which we increment
̺t(i
∗, a∗), nt(i
∗, a∗), and nt(i
∗) accordingly. The hyperparameters of the algo-
rithm, max radius and max clusters, we chosen by a coarse grid search: best
performance was achieved for max radius=6 and max clusters=500 (our re-
sults also include some other combinations.)
Results The resulting performance of both CMABFAS and the baseline is shown
in Figure 5 in terms of the cumulative regret, while Table 1 shows the results
numerically in greater depth. Figure 4 illustrates the partitioning behavior of
CMABFAS over time. In summary, the results show that CMABFAS is about
an order of magnitude better than the best parameter setting of the baseline.
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Fig. 4. Left: number of balls CMABFAS creates over time (3 actions). Right:
How the minimum radius changes over time (3 actions)
The curves reflect the kind of learning behavior that we would have expected
and which is typical for MAB algorithms of this kind: initially, the reward dis-
tributions are unknown and thus the algorithm has to “explore” and try out the
various actions over different regions in the context space. Over time, and this
happens very rapidly with CMABFAS, the granularity of the ball-cover of the
context space is refined in areas of high data-density and the estimates for the
mean reward become more accurate, this in turn makes the algorithm become
more confident about its decisions and explore less. The performance CMABFAS
reaches at the end is nearly optimal: both the regret and the number of mistakes
approach zero (averaged over all calls, the algorithm makes the correct decision
with > 99.9%). We also note that CMABFAS appears to scale well when the
number of available actions is increased (see the 10 action and 50 action results).
Finally, recall that CMABFAS is an anytime algorithm. If we would continue to
run it and process additional calls, the error rate would further decrease until
(asymptotically) no more mistakes are made.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have undertaken first steps towards making a complex decision-
making SPIT filter (i.e., a SPIT filter which has to choose among more than two
alternatives without access to prior labeled data and only based on stochastic
and sparse feedback) become fully self-learning by formulating it as a contextual
multi-armed bandit. The simulation results are encouraging; it should be noted
though that due to the nature of the problem (SPIT is largely hypothetical and
barely existent nowadays but believed to be a potential threat as VoIP becomes
more widespread in the future) our results are biased by the modeling decisions
we had to make (e.g., setting success probabilities by hand). Nevertheless, we
believe that this research is both highly innovative and useful and could also be
applied to other security-related problems which can be formulated in a similar
way.
1
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t =10,000 calls t =100,000 calls t =10,000,000 calls
regret/t nmistakes1 nmistakes2 regret/t nmistakes1 nmistakes2 regret/t nmistakes1 nmistakes2
Actions 3
CMABFAS 0.02811 753 374 0.00737 2195 1030 0.00023 6983 1378
Na¨ıve: c = 50, r = 2 0.06110 1368 559 0.04446 10,879 3170 0.04161 1,023,897 256,776
Na¨ıve: c = 50, r = 6 0.03833 961 484 0.02199 5946 2305 0.01862 504,703 172,502
Na¨ıve: c = 200, r = 6 0.05872 1376 920 0.01180 3238 1957 0.00121 32,842 12,810
Na¨ıve: c = 500, r = 6 0.05994 1382 971 0.01319 3463 2156 0.00106 31,242 12,323
Actions 10
CMABFAS 0.04831 1616 397 0.01141 5576 864 0.00070 99,757 1312
Na¨ıve: c = 50, r = 2 0.13012 3228 1276 0.0579 20,330 5,715 0.04238 1,725,953 428,724
Na¨ıve: c = 50, r = 6 0.10599 2901 971 0.03428 10,225 3013 0.01747 500,767 147,629
Na¨ıve: c = 200, r = 6 0.15095 3378 1329 0.04826 16,967 4354 0.00342 107,174 23,170
Na¨ıve: c = 500, r = 6 0.15343 3413 1387 0.05233 17,769 4993 0.00272 98,568 19,958
Actions 50
CMABFAS 0.08067 4124 2570 0.01745 13,921 9917 0.00175 252,437 217,973
Na¨ıve: c = 50, r = 2 0.3153 8473 6190 0.12692 49,595 28,147 0.01367 796,852 353,873
Na¨ıve: c = 50, r = 6 0.26239 7785 5416 0.10556 42,182 20,700 0.01208 736,471 304,461
Na¨ıve: c = 200, r = 6 0.30579 7965 5541 0.13792 46,887 25,165 0.01569 762,208 190,428
Na¨ıve: c = 500, r = 6 0.30810 8008 5576 0.14247 46,899 25,258 0.01685 788,416 209,656
Table 1. Quantitative results of the SPIT filter. We compare CMABFAS with a na¨ıve baseline implementation for various
settings of its hyperparameters (see text). The table shows the performance at three different points in time: at the beginning
of the learning (after 10,000 calls), towards the middle of the learning (after 100,000 calls), and towards the end of learning
(after 10,000,000 calls). Performance is given in terms of regret/t, where regret is equal to the sum of the expected reward
obtained when we would have chosen the best action minus expected reward of the action that our SPIT filter has chosen (thus
zero regret means we have always chosen the best action). The column nmistakes1 shows the number of times the SPIT filter
chooses an action which is not optimal with respect to the expected reward (an error which can mean, for example, that the
SPIT filter correctly chose to apply a security challenge to SPIT call but not the security challenge with the highest probability
of success/least cost ratio). The column nmistakes2 shows the number of times the SPIT filter chooses action A0 for a SPIT
call (i.e., fails to block SPIT) or chooses one of actions A1. . .A50 for a NON-SPIT call (i.e., applies a security challenge to a
NON-SPIT call). The best result for each case is marked in bold face; we can see that in terms of regret CMABFAS is about
an order of magnitude better than the best baseline.
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Fig. 5. Comparing CMABFAS with na¨ıve clustering and standard UCB1 MAB.
Lower numbers indicate better performance.
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